Presidential hopefuls Daniel Scioli (FpV), Mauricio Macri (PRO) and Florencio Randazzo (FpV) take part in a meeting at Pink House in 2008, when their presidential hopes were still under wraps.
By Sebastián Lacunza
Editor-in-Chief
Editor-in-Chief
No centre-left options in 2015 as conservatives expect extraordinary performance
Even with the unknowns generated by an abuse of marketing and a boost from certain media preferences, Mauricio Macri’s presidential bid is the most solid conservative campaign in the history of Argentine democracy. From what we have seen so far, the Argentine centre-right has only been able to show strength at the ballot box when it has camouflaged itself within Peronism or the Radicals, or when it appealed to the much less elegant electoral fraud a century ago.
The flipside of Macri’s success is that the October elections will most likely not feature a progressive ballot in the voting booth — a paradox at the end of a long decade of Kirchnerism, which has been portrayed as a centre-left strand of Peronism. Even more so when President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner enjoys the support of four out of every 10 Argentines (according to Poliarquía consultancy), a high value given Latin America’s current state of affairs and recognized as such by Macri’s Ecuadorean consultant Jaime Durán Barba.
For now the Kirchnerite Victory Front (FpV) has two candidates that have been able to generate support both from voters and Peronist provincial strongmen. First, Daniel Scioli, a politician whose various political chiefs (Carlos Menem, Eduardo Duhalde, Néstor Kirchner and CFK) have valued his loyalty but whom nobody, not even the candidate himself, would dare to call “progressive.” Within the ruling party constellation, the only threat to the Buenos Aires governor is Interior and Transport Minister Florencio Randazzo, who appears to have a monothematic campaign theme: trains. Sometimes he allows praise for “transformative Peronism that combats corporations” but neither his rhetoric nor his past reinforce the themes that one would expect from the centre-left. Other Victory Front hopefuls such as Defence Minister Agustín Rossi or former Foreign Minister Jorge Taiana do feel comfortable in that realm but today their names barely register token support.
It is true that Néstor and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner used the element of surprise as an essential tool to dominate the public agenda. The strategy had successes but also led to some evident missteps. The last major coronation propelled directly by Government House was the appointment of Martín Insaurralde to lead the FpV ballot in 2013 in an attempt at containing the dissident Peronist threat posed by Sergio Massa in Buenos Aires province. At the time, Fernández de Kirchner put the powerful Kirchnerite party structure at the service of promoting a man whose political ideas are unknown because he has not expressed them yet. Entertained by show business and on the back of the high-visibility and awareness generated by the 2013 campaign, Insaurralde — an invention of Cristina who two years ago was loudly supported by La Cámpora — is now mulling his political future.
In any case, a personal political bid by CFK that could shake the electoral scene cannot be ruled out. According to the president’s barely-concealed preferences, another K era could take place. In that scenario, a blessing for Economy Minister Axel Kicillof could become an effort to arrive at the national elections with aspirations of a sweet defeat, government spokespersons recognize while also emphasizing the conditional tense. That option, expressed with a dose of realism, would be to lose on one’s own terms (against Macri, Sergio Massa or even Scioli) with a dignified result before contributing to a victory that is considered foreign. In that scheme, Keynesian Kicillof — mistaken for a neo-Marxist by some foreign press — could represent the elusive centre-left in the voting booth.
Kirchnerism became a national political force by taking the left’s rallying cries on board, but its co-existence with the Justicialist Party and the vices that were already visible during its administration of Santa Cruz province ensured that a part of the so-called progressives distanced themselves, if not directly opposed it. As such, there are more than a few who consider themselves centre-left and would rather see Macri in the Government House rather than a candidate that indicates continuity with the current government.
The UNEN alliance tried to take advantage of that space, but it floundered in a sea of contradiction between leaders that only saw eye to eye when it came to excessive personalism. Those who remained in the ex-UNEN (the Socialist Party and other minor parties of Radical, Trostkyist or Peronist origin) are trying to hide the fact that they were the last to find out that Elisa Carrió and the majority of the UCR felt more comfortable in a centre-right project than in a centre-left one. It is assumed that this group of duped parties will align itself behind the candidacy of ex-radical Margarita Stolbizer, that is if no more doubts and personal interests arise.
Amid the disarray of the centre-left, Macri demonstrated once again this week that he best channels the ambition to rule among non-Peronists making it clear to his brand-new partners — the Radical Party (UCR) — that he is not counting on it to co-govern, which is sensible from the point of view of electoral strategy. The deal is limited, he clarified, to competing in the primaries even if there are more private negotiations that go beyond that. Instead of bargaining down the price of the UCR as soon as it sealed its deal with the PRO, Macri paid for the UCR what it’s truly worth.
@sebalacunza